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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 




- v s - . • • ' . ' • • : 
RICHARD CAUBLE, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
. • • • • • • 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1975), 
a felony of the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to a jury in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court. The jury returned a verdict of guilty 
to the charge of theft of property of a value exceeding 
$1,000, and the Honorable George E. Ballif entered a 
judgment and sentence on that verdict. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL I 
Respondent seeks an order affirming the judgment 
and sentence entered by the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In November, 1974, defendant was employed by 
Western Leisure Industries, Inc., a corporation that 
manufactures and sells house trailers. On November 
13, 1974, defendant sold three of the company's trailers to 
Boyd Wheelwright,,: He paid for the trailerls with a check 
in the amount of $9,262 drawn on an office of Zions 
First National Bank located in Utah County (T. 47, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 6). At the time Mr. Wheelwright 
delivered the check to the defendant, the defendant 
stated that he was going to use some of the money to 
"reimburse himself." (T. 49,112). 
On November 14, 1974, the defendant took the 
check to an office of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust located 
in Salt Lake County, opened an account in the name of 
the Mansford Corporation (a pseudonym for the defendant) 
and deposited the check. The defendant then withdrew from 
the account $262.00 cash and approximately $4,917 in the 
form of a cashier's check made out to the Blazor Corpor-
ation, the sole stockholder of Western Leisure. The 
defendant delivered the check to Mr. Giles, the 
company's comptroller, in exchange for a promissory 
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note in the amount of the check. The defendant told Mr/ 
Giles that the money had come from a lawsuit he had won 
back East (T.29). About one week later, Norma Peterson, 
Office Manager for Western Leisure, asked the defendant 
about the Wheelwright transaction at her office in Payson 
(T. 51,58). The defendant told Mrs. Peterson that the 
deal had fallen through and promised to return the 
Statements of Origin covering the trailers to her (T. 58). 
Mr. Giles testified that the normal procedure following 
the sale of a trailer was to deliver the check to Mrs. 
Peterson in Payson, who would receipt the check before it 
was deposited into a company account by either Mr. Giles 
or Mrs. Peterson (T. 15,21). Mr. Giles also testified 
that if a check was received in Salt Lake City, the check 
could be directly delivered to Mr. Giles1 Salt Lake City 
office, and that this was the only circumstance where 
Mrs. Peterson's office would be bypassed (T.21). Mr. 
Giles testified that the defendant had•no authority to 
endorse or sign checks (T. 22). The defendant testified 
that on occasions he would not take the checks to Mrs. 
Peterson's Office if he were in another area (T. 132). 
The defendant did not deny depositing the check 
in question into his account, but claimed that he was 
entitled to the money because Western Leisure had failed 
to reimburse him for certain expenses and back pay. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On .November 13, 1976, the defendant claimed that the 
amount owed him was between $9,500 and $10,000 (T. 130). 
The defendant at first claimed that he had deposited 
no other checks belonging to his employer into his own 
account, but later admitted that he had offset checks 
of about $3,327 and $1,215 prior to the incident in 
November, 1974 (T. 148, 161-163, 168). 
Boyd Saderup, President of the Blazor Corporation 
testified that his accounting records showed that the 
defendant was owed between $300 and $600. David Giles 
testified that the only unpaid claims due to the defendant 
amounted to between $200 and $300, and that the defendant 
had received some $2,017 in advance for expenses which the 
defendant had not accounted for by the return of vouchers, 
receipts or cancelled checks, despite requests to do so 
(T. 189-191). 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty and judgment 
was entered on that verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT!S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE GROUND OF IMPROPER 
VENUE. 
A. Defendant waived his objection to improper 
venue. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2) (Supp. 1975), 
provides that: 
"All objections of improper place 
of trial are waived by a defendant 
unless made before trial." 
In the recent case of State v. Christean, 533 P.2d 872 
(Utah 1975) this Court held that a defendant in a criminal 
case can waive his constitutional right to have an action 
against him tried in the county where the cause of 
action arose, that the waiver need not be express, and 
that an objection made for the first time on appeal will 
not be considered. 
In this case, defendant made no objection to the 
place of his trial until after the State had rested its 
case (T. 8 6). Counsel for the State indicated that a timely 
request for a transfer would have been honored (T.87). 
Defendant has not alleged any reasons that excuse or 
explain the delay, nor has any prejudice to the defendant 
been shown. 
As the Court stated in State v. Biggs, 198 Ore. 
413, 255 P.2d 1055, the gist of the constitutional guarantee 
of a fair and impartial trial in the county where the 
crime was committed is a fair and impartial trial, and 
the guarantee of the place of trial is a mere incident 
of the primary right to a fair trial. 
Respondent submits that the defendant was given 
a fair trial in all respects, and that defendant's belated 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
attempt to invoke a technical error should be denied 
as being contrary to the interest of justice. 
B. The crime of theft as defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1975), was completed in Utah 
County where the trial was held. 
Respondent submits that the analysis of the 
issue of where the crime occurred turns on the resolution 
of an ambiguity in the statute that defines theft. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1975) , states that "a person 
commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized con-
trol over the property of another with a purpose to de-
prive him thereof.11 It is not clear whether the word 
"obtains" in the statute refers to "unauthorized control" 
or to "property". In other words, the statute is sub-
ject to two constructions: 
1. A person commits theft if he obtains the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof 
or if he exercises unauthorized control over the property 
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
2. A person commits theft if he obtains un-
authorized control or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
Respondent submits that the first interpretation 
is more in keeping with the legislative intent. The 
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phrases "obtains control" and "exercises control" are 
interchangeable and the use of both terms would be 
mere surplusage under the second interpretation of the 
statute. However, a person may exercise unauthorized 
control over property without obtaining it, as when a 
thief directs an innocent agent to deliver property 
belonging to another to a creditor of the thief, 
or when a thief deprives an owner of his property by 
destroying or misusing it. The use of both terms would 
be logical and necessary under the first interpretation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(2) (Supp. 1975) defines 
"obtain" as meaning "to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some.other legally recognized interest 
in property. . . . " without reference to unauthorized 
control. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407 (Supp. 1975) defines 
the crime of theft of lost property solely in terms of 
obtaining property without mention of unauthorized 
control. Respondent submits that the first interpretation 
of.the statute defining theft is the proper construction, 
and that unauthorized control is not always an element 
of the crime of theft. 
Under this interpretation of the statute, it 
is clear that the crime of theft was completed in Utah 
county, because the defendant admitted obtaining the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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t 
check from Mr. Wheelwright in Utah County with an intent 
to convert it to his own use (T. 1.12). 
Assuming that this Court were to adopt the second 
interpretation of the statute defining theft, respondent 
still submits that the crime of theft was completed in 
Utah County. Defendant's contention that the evidence 
clearly establishes his authority to receive checks in 
Utah County and to deliver them to an office in Salt 
Lake City is not supported by the record (T. 15,21,132). 
Assuming defendant did have that authority, he would 
still be without authority to turn the checks over to 
a creditor of his employer. Such a delivery would be 
an unauthorized control in the county where it occurred, 
even if the creditor deposited the checks in another 
county. In this case, defendant claimed to be a creditor 
of his employer, and when he took the checks into his 
personal possession intending to retain them in satisfaction 
of a supposed debt, he in effect delivered the checks 
to a creditor in excess of his authority. 
Assuming that all of defendant's behavior in 
Utah County were within the scope of his authority as 
an agent of the corporation, defendant would still have 
exercised "unauthorized control" over the property as 
that phrase is used in the statute. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-404(4) (Supp. 1975) defines the phrase "obtain 
-8-
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or exercise unauthorized control" to include, inter 
alia, conduct heretofore known or defined as common 
law embezzlement. In other words, if the defendant's 
acts in Utah County constituted the common law crime 
of embezzlement, the venue of the action would properly 
be in Utah County. 
In the case of State v. Dykes, 261 Iowa, 1363 
158 N.W. 2d 154 (1968) the defendant was charged with 
embezzlement of a load of grain. The grain was entrusted 
to the defendant in Story County for delivery in Scott 
County, but the defendant sold the grain in Appanoose 
County. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that venue was 
properly laid in Story County, reasoning that: 
"Where the defendant received 
property in a county of this State 
and thereafter fraudulently converts 
the same to his own use, the jury 
may be authorized by the evidence to 
conclude that the intent to convert 
the same was formed in the county 
where the property was entrusted to 
him, and venue under such evidence may 
properly be laid in that county.ff 
158 N.W.2d at 157. 
Again, the defendant by his own admission expressed 
intent to convert the check to his ovm use when he received 
it in Utah County (T. 112). 
In the case of People v. Brock, 21 Cal. App. 
2d 601, 70 P.2d 210 (1937), the defendant was charged 
with grand theft of machinery belonging to a mining 
company of which he was a director. The equipment was 
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removed from a mine and taken to a location in San 
Bernadino County, and later sold in Los Angeles County. 
The court held that, although the actual misappropriation 
took place in Los Angeles, the evidence justified an 
inference that the intent to embezzle was formed in 
San Bernadino, and that the defendant could properly 
be tried there. It is interesting to note that in Iowa 
and California, unlike Utah, the prosecution must prove 
venue beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent submits 
that the evidence unequivocally demonstrates the forma-
tion of a criminal intent in Utah County, and under the 
terms of Utah Code Ann. 76-6-401(4) (Supp. 1975), 
venue was properly laid there. 
Alternatively, venue could be laid in Utah County 
on the theory that defendant failed to account there. 
In Williams v. State, 365 P.2d 569 (Okla. Crim. 1961), 
defendant was charged with embezzlement of funds he had 
received as a salesman for an insurance company. The 
defendant claimed that he could only be tried where the . 
checks had been cashed, but the court held that the prosecu-
tion could be brought where the defendant had an obligation 
to account for the funds. In this case, a demand for 
the money was made in Utah County (T. 51,58). See also 
State v. Boulet, 5 Wash. 2d 654, 106 P.2d 311 (1940). 
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Finally, venue could be properly laid in Utah 
County because the check the defendant embezzled was 
drawn on a bank located there, and consequently the 
check was paid there. In People v. Keller, 79 Cal. 
App. 612, 250 P.585 (1926), a corporate vice-president 
deposited a company check in a bank located in Orange 
County, and wrote an unauthorized check against the 
account in Los Angeles County. The court held that the 
offense of embezzlement was completed in Orange County 
where the bank honored the check.. See also State v. 
Johnson, 109 Kan. 239, 199 P. 104 (1921). 
In sum, respondent submits that the crime of 
theft was completed in the county where defendant was 
tried because defendant obtained the property with 
intent to deprive there, failed to account there, and 
the check stolen was paid there. 
C. Venue was properly laid pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (1) (g) (iii) (Supp. 1975), a con-
stitutional statute. 
Defendant has challenged Utah Code Ann. 76-1-202 
(1) (g) (iii) (Supp. 1975) as denying his constitutional 
right to trial where the crime occurred. As this court 
stated in White v. Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 
25 U. 346, 71 P. 593 (1903), the constitutional right to 
a particular place of trial must be interpretated in light 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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! 
of the common law existing at the time the constitution 
was adopted. Although there is a general rule prohibiting 
the prosecution of a criminal defendant in a county other 
than that where the crime occurred, there is a widely 
recognized exception for larceny* 22 C.J.S. Criminal 
Law § 185(8} states: 
"Both at common law and under 
statutory provisions in most states 
one who steals property in one 
county and brings it into another 
may be indicted and tried for simple 
larceny either in the county where 
the theft was committed, or in any 
county into or through which the 
stolen property was brought; the 
theory being that the possession of 
the stolen goods by the thief is a 
larceny in every county through or 
into which he carries them, because 
as the legal possession still remains 
in the owner, every moment's continuance 
of the trespass and felony amounts to 
a new taking and asportation. . . ." * 
Statutes declarative of this common law rule 
have been upheld against constitutional attacks. 156 
ALR 882, 886, states: 
"The conflict of authority on the 
subject has been alleviated in many 
jurisdictions by enactment of statutes 
in effect recognizing the majority view 
by providing in substance that any 
person who shall steal in another state 
or country any goods and shall thereafter 
bring the same into the state may be 
prosecuted and convicted of larceny in 
the county to which such goods are 
brought or in which he is found, in 
the same manner as if such larceny had 
been committed in this state, and that 
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in every such case the larceny 
may be charged to have been 
committed in any county into or 
through which such stolen property 
may have been brought. 
* * * 
The constitutionality of such 
statutes and the power of the 
legislature to enact them have 
been for the most part sustained as 
against various objections, such as 
. . . that it is violative of the 
constitutional provision securing 
in all criminal prosecutions the 
right to a speedy and public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county 
in which the crime shall have been 
committed. . . . " 
In addition to the authorities collected in the above 
annotations, respondent respectfully refers this Court 
to People v. Brickey, 346 111. 273, 178 N.E. 483 (1931), 
State v. Bretz, 534 P.2d 496 (Mont. 1975), and Schultz 
v. Lainson, 234 Iowa 606, 13 N.W. 2d 326 (1944) upholding 
state statutes allowing prosecution for theft in any 
county into which stolen property is brought against con-
stitutional attacks. 
Appellant has cited State v. Caroll, 55 Wash. 
588, 104 Pac. 814 (1909), as authority that such a 
statute is unconstitutional. Actually the Washington 
Court refused to apply such a statute to a burglary 
prosecution, where the theory of a continuing trespass 
clearly does not apply. The court did recognize that: 
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"It is generally true that in 
cases of larceny courts have 
generally held that the defendant 
could be tried either in the county 
where the offense was committed, 
or in the county to which the goods 
have been removed." 104 at P. 814. 
The Washington Supreme Court has upheld a statute 
allowing a defendant to be prosecuted for larceny in any 
county into which stolen property is brought. State 
v. Moore, 189 Wash. 680, 66 P.2d 836 (1937). 
It is important to remember the narrow application 
and remedial purpose of the Utah statute. Under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (1) (g) (iii) (Supp. 1975), a 
prosecution can only be brought in the county where only 
control of the property is shown when "it cannot be 
readily determined in which county or district the offense 
occurred." Utah Code Ann. §76-1-202(1) (g) (Supp. 1975). 
Such a common sense attempt to deal with the technical 
problem of venue in a criminal prosecution is clearly 
remedial and subject to liberal construction within 
constitutional limits. Addington v. State, 199 Kan. 
554, 431 P.2d 532 (167). 
It is clear that defendant had control of the 
property in Utah County, and under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202 
(1) (g) (iii) (Supp. 1975) venue was properly laid in Utah 
County. 
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Respondent submits that it was not error to deny 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the grounds 
of improper venue. 
POINT II 
THE STATE PROVED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (3) (Supp. 1975) states 
that: 
"The existence of jurisdiction 
and venue are not elements of the 
offense but shall be established by 
a preponderance of the evidence." 
In the case of State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d 
618 (1955), this court held that venue need only be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
venue was not an element of an offense and that venue 
could be established inferentially from circumstantial 
evidence. 
As argued more extensively in Point I above, 
defendant has waived any objection he may have had to 
the place of trial and the evidence supports the finding 
that venue was in Utah County. Respondent submits that 
the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict. 
POINT III 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S TAKING OF OTHER CHECKS 
BELONGING TO HIS EMPLOYER WAS RELEVANT AND PROPERLY 
ADMITTED. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\ 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55 provides that 
evidence of other crimes is admissible to establish 
absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity. 
In this case, the major issue at trial was 
the defendant's motive and intent in appropriating 
his employer's check* Identity was not at issue because 
defendant admitted cashing the check (T. 112-113). 
Although the evidence of defendant's taking of other checks 
revealed an inconsistency in the defendant's testimony, 
it was not admitted for the purpose of attacking his 
credibility as evidence of prior felony convictions 
would be. The evidence was admitted to shed light 
on defendant's claim that the check was taken pursuant 
to a bona fide claim of right, and demonstrated that the 
taking was pursuant to a common plan or scheme. 
When this purpose for the admission of the 
evidence is kept in mind, the authority cited by the 
defendant is clearly distinguishable. In the case of 
State v. Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), this 
Court held that evidence of prior dissimiliar robberies 
was inadmissible to establish a defendant's identity as 
a robber. In State v. Kazda, 14 U. 2d 266, 382 P.2d 
407 (1963), a defendant's prior criminal record was 
brought out for the purpose of impeaching his testimony. 
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The admission of details about the prior crimes was 
held prejudicial error because: 
" . . . the details or circumstances 
surrounding the felony or felonies for 
which the accused was convicted may not 
be inquired into except under unusual 
circumstances where the inquiry would 
tend to show a scheme, plan, modus 
operandi or the like." 14 U.2d at 269. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Peterson, 23 U.2d 58, 457 P.2d 532 
(1969), a defendant charged v/ith selling LSD entered into 
evidence a theme he had written showing his opposition 
to drugs. The prosecutor's attempt to smear the defendantfs 
character by inquiring into incidences of drug use was 
held prejudical. None of these authorities stand for the 
proposition that when a defendant embezzles a check with 
criminal intent, pursuant to a scheme or plan, that 
evidence of other thefts showing this intent and part 
of the same plan cannot be admitted. 
In State v. Lack, 118 U.128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950), 
a defendant was charged with embezzlement of whiskey, and 
evidence that the defendant had sold this whiskey to 
clubs and split payments was held to be admissible even 
though it showed commission of other crimes not charged. 
The evidence was found to be relevant to a scheme or 
plan. In State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1975), 
a defendant was charged with mishandling public money, 
and evidence of other shortages in the defendant's 
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department was held admissible as tending to show motive, 
intent, and absence of mistake or accident. 
In State v. Georgopoulos, 27 U.2d 53, 492 P2d 
1353 (1972) a defendant was charged with receiving 
stolen goods, and evidence of the possession of other 
stolen items was held admissible as bearing on the 
guilty knowledge of the defendant. 
In this case, defendant claimed an innocent 
intent in taking $9,262 belonging to his employer because 
he believed he was entitled to between $9,500 and 
$10,000. Evidence that the defendant had already stolen 
some $4,500 was clearly relevant in assessing the honesty 
of that claim, and evidence that the prior takings had 
occurred in precisely the same manner showed that the 
taking was according to a common scheme. In factual 
settings indistinguishable from the present case, evidence 
of this type was held properly admitted. State v. Hess, 
86 Wash. 2d 51, 541 P.2d 1222 (1975), People v. Kendall, 
•151 P.2d 39, 65 Cal.App.2d 569 (1944) and Thorp v. People, 
110 Colo. 7, 129 P.2d 296 (1942). Respondent submits that 
evidence of other checks taken by the defendant was 
properly admitted as relevent to the issues of motive, 
-18-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intent, absence of mistake or accident, and the presence 
of a common scheme* 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the defendant was tried 
in the proper county, that the State provided all 
elements of the offense and that the evidence admitted 
at trial was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The 
judgment and sentence of the lower court should be, 
therefore, affirmed„ 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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